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CONSTITUTIONAL LA W-SELF•lNCRIMINATION-DENIAL OF PRIVI-
LEGE TO GENERAL PARTNER HoLDING SUBPOENAED BooKS AND RECORDS OF LIM• 
ITED PARTNERSHIPS-A special agent of the Internal Revenue Service sought 
enumerated books and records of four New York limited partnerships in 
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connection with petitioner's tax liability for prior years. A subpoena duces 
tecum was issued directing petitioner to produce the records,1 which were 
in his possession as general partner. Petitioner, his son, and his son-in-law 
were the general partners of each limited partnership involved, with limited 
partners ranging from twenty-five to 119 in number and capitalization from 
225,000 dollars to 2,740,000 dollars. The partnerships, together with a 
management company, were housed in a single office with a staff of one 
secretary. Petitioner claimed that the order to deliver the books and records 
to the special agent violated his constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.2 On appeal from a district court order upholding the sub-
poena,3 held, affirmed. Where the size and extent of limited partnership 
operations show that a general partner's personal interest in the company 
books and records is subordinate to the interest of the company as a whole, 
the partner is holding the books in a purely representative capacity and 
may not claim for himself the privilege against self-incrimination as to the 
books subpoenaed. United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1963). 
Personal papers and records have long been sheltered by the individual's 
constitutional protection against self-incrimination.4 Since the privilege is 
defined as a purely personal right, it cannot be claimed by a legal entity such 
as a corporation,15 although corporations are protected by the fourth amend-
ment sanction against unreasonable searches and seizures.6 Since no person 
has standing to refuse testimony by claiming only that the evidence may 
incriminate another person, 7 a corporation may not withhold books and 
records tending to incriminate one of its officers personally, although the 
subpoena is directed to the officer who as record custodian has kept the 
corporation books.8 The fact that the corporation must comply with a 
1 Pursuant to INT. REY. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 7402(b), 7602, 7604. 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V, "No person ••• shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself • • • ." 
3 United States v. Silverstein, 210 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
4 Boyd v. United States, ll6 U.S. 616 (1886). The privilege has been held to apply to 
any proceeding where the defendant is asked to produce evidence which might tend to 
incriminate him of some offense, or subject him to fines, penalties, or forfeitures, Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), including a hearing before a special agent of the 
Internal Revenue Service, as in the principal case, see, e.g., In re Turner, 309 F.2d 69 
(2d Cir. 1962). The claim of privilege must be raised at the first instance of required 
production of books and records held by the claimant, even where the initial investiga-
tion is civil rather than criminal. E.g., Grant v. United States, 291 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 
1961) (failure to claim privilege at time of civil audit of books by tax examiners). More• 
over, the defendant is required at least to bring the subpoenaed material into court so 
that the court may make its own determination of the incriminating nature of the 
documents. Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928). 
G Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). English courts hold to the contrary. Triplex 
Safety Glass Co. v. Lancegaye Safety Glass, [1939] 2 K.B. 395. 
6 Hale v. Henkel, supra note 5, at 76. 
7 Id. at 69-70. 
8 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). The same seems to apply even where 
the custodian is the sole stockholder and officer of the corporation. See Grant v. United 
States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); In re Greenspan, 187 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United 
States v. Hoyt, 53 F.2d 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). But see Application of Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 
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subpoena seeking its books, which might incriminate one of its officers, 
should not be altered by the circumstance that the officer involved has 
custody of the books. The denial to corporations and their officers of the 
privilege against self-incrimination was extended by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. White9 to include non-corporate organizations and their 
officers, whenever any such group is found to more nearly embody a com-
mon or group interest rather than the purely personal interests of its mem-
bers.10 
Discussion of the policy bases of the organizational exception to the 
claim of privilege usually centers on the distinction between intimidation 
of the individual and of an impersonal entity.11 In addition, three justifica-
tions are offered for denial of the right to custodians of organizational 
records. The first theory, advanced in the principal case,12 is that by choos-
ing a purely statutory form of business organization, a corporation or 
limited partnership and its constituents thereby elect to submit to the 
visitatorial power of the state over the company's record of dealings. This 
argument is unsatisfactory because it simply begs the question; the issue is 
whether that power may constitutionally be exercised.18 Moreover, it fails 
to justify the exception in the case of a non-corporate group,14 and has no 
application to an order by a federal agency for books of a state-chartered 
company. In neither of these two cases has the organization submitted to 
the visitatorial power of the authority actually demanding the evidence. 
322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Despite the courts' refusal to allow organizational custodians to claim 
the privilege against self-incrimination when ordered to produce books and records 
which they hold, the government's subpoena power is still restricted by the unreasonable 
search and seizure sanction, Fleming v. Montgomery Ward &: Co., II4 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 3ll U.S. 690 (1940), and by the inability to elicit oral testimony from the 
officer other than to identify the records produced, Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 
II8 (1957); United States v. Daisart Sportswear, Inc., 169 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1948); United 
States v. Pollock, 201 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Ark. 1962). The issuer of the subpoena must 
also prove that the records actually exist, and that they are within the control and 
possession of the subpoenaed party. Curcio v. United States, supra; United States v. 
Patterson, 219 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1955). 
!l 322 U.S. 694 (1944), involving a subpoena directed to an officer of a labor union 
ordering him to produce certain books and records of the union. 
10 Id. at 701. 
11 Thus it is said that fear of intimidation of the witness, from which the right 
against self-incrimination historically grew, has no bearing upon written evidence gathered 
from impersonal groups. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2259a (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
12 Principal case at 791. 
18 See 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note II, § 2259b. This visitatorial power theory 
underlies the categorical approach taken in cases involving corporate officers. See note 
8 supra. The notion is closely related to the much-criticized public records doctrine, 
which would subject all records required to be kept by law to the state's inspection for 
any purpose. The doctrine was applied in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. I (1948), 
but sharply criticized in Spilky, Have We Lost Our Civil Rights in Tax Matters?, 37 
TAXES 603 (1959). 
14 While a limited partnership, such as that in the principal case, is a state-chartered 
form of business association, the visitatorial power argument fails both for lack of an 
answer to the constitutional question, see note 13 supra, and because of the dangers of 
strict categorization, see note 29 infra and accompanying text. 
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Second, the argument is made that the custodian must share his view of 
the books with any stockholder, partner, or limited partner who wishes to 
see them. As justification for a requirement that the custodian tum over 
the records to the government, this idea is irrelevant; the fact that someone 
other than the custodian has the right to see the company's books is no 
reason why a government should share that right.15 Finally, some suggest 
that effective law enforcement in the case of large enterprises faces special 
difficulties of proof not found in proceedings against individuals.16 Such a 
policy, however, is not applicable to an investigation of individual criminal-
ity, as in the principal case. 
The argument for effective law enforcement as a justification for denial 
of the privilege to organizational record custodians reveals most strikingly 
the common failure of the courts to recognize that in many cases the record 
of a company's dealings may be equated with the dealings of an individual. 
If the individual custodian can show that the acts of his company are in 
fact his acts, executed in great measure in his own personal interest, then 
he should be allowed to withhold self-incriminating company records of 
those acts. In the White case the Supreme Court provided at least a clue 
to the determination of such an identity of company and personal action: 
"The test . . . is whether one can fairly say under all the circum-
stances that a particular type of organization has a character so im-
personal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot 
be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests 
of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group 
interests only."11 
The Court apparently meant this test to apply only to a claim of privilege 
by the organization itself, and by its officers acting in an official capacity;18 
the Court brushed aside the defendant's claim of self-incrimination on his 
own behalf by noting that he had not shown that included in the group 
records were any of "his own private papers.''19 In subsequent organiza-
tional cases the Court has never fully applied the White test; rather, in 
most instances the White case has been cited in support of summary con-
clusions that organizations represented by defendant custodians were im-
personal.20 Lower court cases involving partnerships have, however, ap-
plied the test to determine the impersonal nature of the partnership in 
each case.21 In the only case in which it was argued that the White test 
15 See 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 11, § 2259b. 
16 Sec ibid. 
17 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944). 
1s Ibid. 
19 Id. at 704. 
20 Sec, e.g., McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960) (Civil Rights Congress); 
Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. ll8 (1957) (labor union); Rogers v. United States, 340 
U.S. 367 (1951) (Communist Party of Denver); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 
(1950) ijoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee). 
21 Privilege upheld: United States v. Linen Serv. Council, 141 F. Supp. 5ll (D.N.J. 
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applied only to pleas of self-incrimination by organizations and not to 
cases of individual claims of self-incrimination, the court rejected the argu-
ment, holding that, regardless of who is in danger of being incriminated, 
the records must still be held in a purely personal capacity if the privilege 
is to apply.22 This answer is correct if it means that in each case the test of 
the organization's personal or impersonal structure will show whether both 
the custodian on his own behalf and the organization itself may claim the 
privilege, or whether the organization is so impersonal that no one's in-
dividual acts may be equated with the group's acts. The issue, in a claim 
by either the individual or by the group, is the possible identity of personal 
and company dealings recorded in the subpoenaed material. If no such 
identity exists, neither the entity nor the individual has the right to with-
hold records. This will be a question of degree in most cases, since all 
organizations represent both personal and group interests to a certain 
extent. 
The principal case, the first to face squarely the problem of a claim of 
the privilege against self-incrimination by a general partner of a limited 
partnership created under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,28 seems 
tacitly to recognize the distinction between wholly impersonal group acts 
and personal acts which may be identical in nature to the dealings of the 
entity. Despite an unfortunately drawn analogy between the nature of the 
limited partnerships involved and the structure of a corporation,24 the 
court applied the White test to find that the limited partnerships were im-
personal in structure and operation. This conclusion was based almost 
solely on the size of the capital fund and the number of limited partners 
in each company. In support of this limited examination, the court found 
authority in the emphasis which the White decision placed upon the scope 
of membership and activities as showing the impersonal nature of a group. 
By thus narrowing the range of the inquiry, the court may have overlooked 
other elements which are important in determining the personal or im-
personal character of company acts. 
1956); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948). Privilege denied: 
United States v. Wemes, 157 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1946); United States v. Onassis, 1!13 
F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1954). 
One pre-White case held the privilege applicable to a partnership. United States v. 
Brasley, 268 Fed. 59 (W .D. Pa. 1920). 
22 United States v. Wemes, supra note 21. 
23 8 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED. Since its promulgation in 1915, thirty-seven states 
have adopted this uniform act. See, e.g., N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAw §§ 90-119. 
24 Principal case at 791. Since general partners bear a far greater burden as to both 
control and assumption of personal liability in a limited partnership than do corporate 
officers, this analogy is inaccurate. See statutes cited notes 25 & 26 infra. Such a compari-
son may have an undesirable impact upon subsequent cases involving claims of self-
incrimination by limited partnerships should the courts use the same categorical approach 
as was applied in the one-man corporation cases cited note 8 supra. Cf. 46 IowA L. REv. 
632 (1961). A better comparison may be found in cases involving business or Massachu-
setts trusts. See United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 894 
(1951); Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1935); United States v. Invader 
Oil Corp., 5 F.2d 715 (S.D. Cal. 1925). 
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Where a limited partnership is involved, at least four elements sliould 
be relevant to the test of impersonality. The restriction against participa-
tion by any but general partners in the control and management of the 
limited partnership25 indicates a more personal type of control than is 
present in the typical corporation. The peculiar form of liability for the 
limited partnership's debts shouldered by each individual member also 
shows a high personal stake of the general partner in the acts of the com-
pany; each general partner is liable for the debts of the whole enterprise,26 
as in ordinary partnerships, while limited partners are liable only to the 
extent of their investment,27 as with corporate stockholders. On the other 
hand, any limited partnership is impersonal when measured by the inter-
est which each limited partner has in the profit of the venture.28 To that 
end, as the court pointed out in the principal case, each limited partner 
has the right to inspect the company books and to receive a full accounting 
at any time.29 The court, however, also considered the statutory means by 
which the limited partnership is created as an additional controlling factor 
in the determination of impersonality of the organizational structure. 
While a limited partnership is certainly a creature of statute,80 this argu-
ment is questionable: first, because attention to the visitatorial power of 
the state forces the court to a strict categorization of a group as "state-
licensed-therefore-impersonal," and second, because the method of forma-
tion is irrelevant to the question of operational structure. The amount of 
capitalization and number of partners, both general and limited, may have 
evidentiary value as to the impersonal nature of each group,81 but should 
not be controlling as against the personal factors represented by the total 
control exercised by, and special liability borne by, the general partners. 
If physical size and the availability of particular state sanctions are accepted 
as important factors in determining the impersonal character of a group, 
then every limited partnership can be found impersonal. If the limited 
partners' stake in the company's profits is sufficient to place the organiza-
tion in the impersonal category, small partnerships desiring to use the 
limited partnership device to reach additional funds must be prepared, 
in return for the privilege of obtaining increased capital, to give up any 
rights, as individuals or entities, to withhold books and records from 
25 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Ac:r § 7. 
26 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP A<::r § 9. 
27 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Ac:r § 7. Limited partners may even transact busi-
ness and deal with the firm in the same manner as strangers. See 56 MICH. L. REv. 285 
(1957). 
28 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP A<::r § 10. 
29 Ibid. This fact is pertinent at this point in the analysis of structure for signs of 
impersonality, whereas the right of limited partners to see the company books and 
records is irrelevant as a policy basis for the exception to the self-incrimination privilege 
made for organizational record custodians. 
80 See Nadler, The Limited Partnership Under the Uniform Limited Partnership 
Act, 65 CoM. L.J. 71 (1960). 
81 See especially the two Onassis cases cited note 21 supra. 
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governmental inspection. Upon fuller consideration, however, the elements 
of control and liability, in the typical limited partnership, should show that 
most such companies are more personal than impersonal, at least where 
the number of general partners is small. Thus a general partner should be 
allowed his right to claim the privilege against self-incrimination as to the 
company books and records. As the court so correctly admitted,82 the fact 
that such a general partner was unable to do so in the principal case reveals 
forcefully the personal danger to individuals inherent in the organizational 
records exception to the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Roger L. McManus 
32 Principal case at 791. 
